This paper investigates the determinants of the participation of workers from the informal sector in public voluntary pension scheme. Based on answers of workers of the informal sector in Vietnam about their willingness to participate in an actuarially fair pension system, it forecast their potential participation to the public voluntary pension scheme Vietnam is about to implement. This system includes institutional features common to many public pension systems: entitlement to pension income is related to a minimum contributory period of 20 years and, a minimum level of contribution related to the minimum wage is required for participation. The results show that these institutional features by worsening the already low inclination of workers to participate reduce significantly the capacity of the system to achieve high coverage rates in the long-term.
INTRODUCTION
Although policy makers around the world widely recognize that social protection programs such as disability insurance, survivor insurance and old-age pensions are welfare enhancing, social insurance coverage rates in developing countries especially when the systems are not mandatory are rather disappointingly low. Several reasons are proposed. Social security systems for non wage employed are often designed with the need of the wage-employed in mind. Part-time working and temporary employed without labor contract are often forgotten categories. All sort of regulations (taxes, licenses, etc) increase the cost of becoming formal by registering to social security (Holtzman, Packard Cuesta, 2000) . Recent studies find also some evidence of self-selection of workers into jobs with/without social protection coverage. Surveys from Brazil and Mexico on workers preferences show that most of the 60/70 percent of the respondents prefer the independence and the higher earnings of the informal sector (Arias, Cunningham and Maloney, 2005) . This paper explores the reasons that explain the low participation to voluntary pension system and the policies that could help the voluntary pension system in Vietnam be more successful in covering the workers of the informal sector.
The study is based on a survey that was organized by Vietnamese Institute of Labor and Social Study and Analysis to understand the determinants of the willingness of the workers of the informal sector to participate in social insurance schemes 1 . The second section presents the methodology of this survey. The third section presents its direct results. Section 4 analyses the determinants of the willingness to participate in a pension system. Section 5 predicts, accordingly, the potential participation of the workers from the informal sector to the voluntary system currently planned in Vietnam. Section 6 draws the policy implications and Section 7 and 8 propose some solutions to increase the system's coverage. Section 9 measures the possible risks of dropping out associated to the policy of subsidies the participation of the poor and the non-poor. Section 10 concludes.
METHODOLOGY
The study uses the results of a survey conducted in 2005 by ILSSA to understand the determinants of the willingness of the workers of the informal sector in Vietnam to participate in a pension system.
Although the government's preliminary drafts indicated its willingness to create a voluntary system very similar to the current mandatory system established for the wage employed, the survey did not choose to ask the participants if they would agree to participate to such a system. The research decided, instead, to measure the willingness of the population to participate in an actuarial fair pension system which characteristics do not particularly favor any group.
Based on actuarial principles, a worker will be willing to participate to a pension system, if the level of well-being it can attain with the pension system's benefits is higher than the level it can attain without, by simply saving the same amount of contributions.
Besides individual characteristics and socio-economic factors, the system's financial return or the present value of the expected pension benefits net of the contribution costs is, therefore, an important determinant of workers' willingness to participate.
In a pension system like the mandatory system in Vietnam the financial return is not constant: for example, with the same amount of contributions men and women are not entitled to the same benefits. Similarly, the financial return does not increase regularly with the contributory length. The returns obtained by participants with less than 20 years are very low because participants are only entitled to one lump sum payment at retirement. There is a large step increase when the participants have contributed 20 years and are entitled to receive a pension. The returns then gradually increase to a certain point (25 to 30 years of contribution depending on men and women) after that they start decreasing because each additional year of pension payment lead to insignificant marginal increase of the benefits. Collecting answers about the willingness to participate to such a scheme would have produce results too dependent to the peculiar characteristics of that scheme.
In the VSIIS survey, participants were asked about their willingness to join a hypothetical and simplified actuarially balanced pension scheme that provides the same financial return to all. Participants were asked if they would join given the payment of a certain level of contribution and the expectation of a pension benefit of about the minimum wage 2 at the age of 60, or about half of the minimum wage at the age of 60 or at the age of 65. The contribution was calculated so that the present value of the sum of the benefits expected to be paid during the retirement period would be equal to the amount of capital saved at retirement if the participant would contribute without interruption until retirement age. Box 1 gives the details about the VSIIS pension scheme.
2 That is of about VND 300 thousand at the time of the survey, or approximately 20 dollars, but it was explained that the amount of benefit will be equal to the minimum wage observed at the time the person will reach retirement.
Box 1: Proposed Retirement Scheme in the VIIS
During the survey, respondents were proposed to participate to a hypothetical and simplified actuarially balanced pension scheme. Prior to the choices, detailed explanations were given about what is a pension scheme.
Participants were, then, asked about their willingness to join given the payment of a certain level of contribution. This amount was calculated so that the present value of the sum of the benefits expected to be paid during the retirement period would be equal to the amount of capital saved at retirement if the participant would contribute without interruption until retirement age.
The required amount of capital at retirement, S T , was approximated using an approach similar to the one described in equation (1). The estimates was obtained through simulations in order to take into account of the Vietnamese population distribution of survival rates by age, and the expected adjustment of the benefits every two years according to the inflation.
(
, where B is the level of pension income, R is the number of payments and r the financial return obtained on the funds during the retirement period.
Given the required amount of savings at retirement, S T , the amount of contributions were obtained using equation (2):
, where a is the age of the participant, c is the fixed amount of contributions paid each month during T-a successive years, and successively reinvested at the rate r.
The main implication of using an actuarially balanced pension schemes is that older generations are required much higher levels of contribution 31 . Because all the participants are assumed to join the pension system at the same time and retire at the same age, older workers have to accumulate the same amount of savings over a shorter period. As Graph 1 illustrates the level of contribution exponentially increases with age. This principle that can be observed in the context of life insurance is rarely observed in public pension schemes where more often contributions are defined as a constant percentage of participants' income.
An iterative bidding process was established in order to elicit participants' preferences. Given a level of contribution related to their age, respondents were first required to consider whether they wanted to participate in the scheme that would entitle them to receive a pension income of about half the minimum wage at the age of 60 4 .
To the difference of the contingent valuation surveys usually applied to estimate the willingness to pay for environmental issues, the level of contribution proposed to each respondent in the VSIIS did not randomly vary across respondents. The issue would be important if the survey wanted to measure how much the respondent price "a pension". This is, however, not the case because pensions are endogenous to the amount of contributions paid before retirement. A specific level of pension corresponds at each level of contribution. Within a certain age-group, the survey could have randomly proposed different levels of contribution and different levels of pension, the sample would have 4 Same age for men and women however needed to be much larger to be able to observe relationships between the choices and the characteristics of the participants 5 . The survey therefore proposed only one level of contribution in relation to the age of the respondent.
Respondent's sensitivity to the level of contribution (and the financial returns)
was obtained though the follow-up questions. For the households that did not show interested in participating at the first question, an option at retirement age of 65 with lower contributions was, then, offered. In case of another refusal, the same scheme was furthermore proposed with three even lower levels of contributions (and thus higher financial returns): 20 percent, 40 percent and 60 percent lower. Table 1 presents the rates of willingness to participate over the total population of the survey depending on which of the 6 levels of contribution consecutively proposed, the respondent finally accepted. Column 4 and 5 report the same distribution if participation is adjusted to ensure consistency with respondents self-reported monthly household savings capacity. Accordingly, 34.5 percent instead of 37.1 percent of the survey's participants would be ready to participate to the proposed pension scheme without any financial support.
DIRECT RESULTS
About 49 percent of respondents refused all the propositions. The results in Table 2 indicate high contributions or lack of money to contribute as the main constraint to their participation. . Note: 1 participants that mention at the first quesiton that a pension equal to half of the minimum wage was to low were proposed to contribute a higher level (based on the same financial return) to obtain a pension equal to the minimum wage. (2002) 6 are more attractive. They are, however, costly and can't be representative of large groups of the population. In the case of pension they are, furthermore, difficult to implement because pension issues requires long-term requirement and horizons.
The VSIIS survey tried to reduce these caveats and searched to follow the recommendations made for the design of stated preferences surveys 7 . The data was collected through personal interviews, after careful several rounds of testing of the questionnaire and training of the interviewers and supervisors. Respondents were given accurate description of the insurance scheme they were proposed, including explanations about insurance principles, and at the time they were questioned about their potential participation into the insurance scheme they were reminded the level of income they had reported earlier in the interview. These precautions maybe partially explain the reason that the VSIIS survey obtains much lower estimates of the willingness to participate than the surveys previously done in Vietnam.
THE DETERMINANTS OF INFORMAL WORKERS' WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE
A worker will be willing to participate to a pension system, if the level of wellbeing it can attain with the pension system's benefits is higher than the level it can attain without, by simply saving the same amount of contributions, or by choosing another oldage income strategy like continuing working or getting the financial support of its friends
6 Eckel (2002) tested respondents' willingness to invest in the long-term by asking them to choose between receiving some cash today or higher amount in 7 years in education expenditures or as retirement savings. 7 Naroo commission, the FAO doc. The VSIIS survey was designed by Sarah Bahles with inputs from P. Castel regarding the structure of the social insurance schemes. Researchers from ILSSA under the guidance of Lan Huong Nguyen Thi conducted the survey.
and relatives. Consequently, participation is related to financial indicators that reflect the costs and benefits of the system and individual, households and socio-economic factors.
In the estimation of the relation (1), the study uses two variables reflecting workers willingness to participate. The first variable W a,i is defined by age group. It is equal to 0 if the person refused to participate to all the options proposed in the survey and 1 if the person accepted to participate to one of them.
The second variable W k,i reflects the willingness of the person i to participate in the pension scheme when the option k was proposed. It varies from 1 to 7. The values 7, 6 and 5 are attributed to the persons who accepted to participate at actuarially fair levels of contributions: in order to receive a benefit of about the minimum wage (level 7), a benefit of half of the minimum wage (level 6) or, a benefit of half of the minimum wage but at the age of 65 instead of 60 (level 5). The values 4, 3 and 2 are attributed to the persons who accepted to participate at lower than actuarially fair levels of contributions.
In order to receive a benefit of half of the minimum wage at the age of 65, these persons required to pay contributions 20 percent lower (level 4), 40 percent lower (level 3), 60 percent lower (level 2) than the level initially proposed in level 5. Finally the level 1 is attributed to the persons who refused all the options.
The explanatory variables are the same in both cases, but in the estimations that uses W k,i the age is also included in the respondent's individual characteristics.
The variable b/w i corresponds to the respondents' replacement rate. It is equal to the ratio of the level of benefit (identical for all 8 ) to the respondent's household income per capita. As the Graph 2 shows, higher levels of willingness to participate are associated to higher levels of replacement rates. The variable c a /w i corresponds to the respondent's contribution rate. It is equal to the ratio of the level of contribution initially proposed in the first question (identical for all the respondents of the same age group in the first question) to the respondent's household income per capita. Lower levels of willingness to participate are associated to higher levels of contribution rates (see Graph 1). The other variables are related to the respondent's individual, household and commune characteristics.
In Graph 1 and 2 respondents' replacement and contribution rates are calculated on households' income per capita, instead of on respondents' income. The reason is that although participating to a pension system is individual, the decision is likely taken also on the basis of the financial burden it represents for tall the household. Similarly, the participation is more attractive if the benefit replaces a substantial portion of the household's income. 
Contribution rate in percent of household incom e per capita Percent of respondents
Note: cumulative participation rates are used, because persons who accepted to participate at a certain contribution rate are assumed to agree to participate at lower contribution rates. Note: cumulative participation rates are used, because persons who accepted to participate at a certain replacement rate are assumed to agree to participate at higher replacement rates.
A conditional (fixed-effects) logistic regression by age group was used to identify the determinants of the willingness to participate by age group W a,i . A maximumlikelihood ordered logit regression in which parameters are estimated given the 7 possible choices of participation was used to identify the determinants of the willingness to accept one of the proposed type of participation W k,i . Table 3 presents the main results. The variables associated to coefficients significant at 10 percent or lower confidence intervals are indicated in bold. The stability of monthly income in relation to consumption needs of the household is strongly associated with higher willingness to participate in both equations. In the same way, positive coefficients are associated with higher saving rates and higher level of taxes, both indicators of wealth.
Similarly higher income level is strongly related to higher willingness. Higher fiscal burden reflected by the tax rate per household income reduces, however, the willingness to participate. Living in a registered poor household and living in a household with a high dependency ratio (the share of elderly and children in the household) have negative impacts on participation.
Rural households are more inclined to participate. Persons who are very patient (that means who always accept in a "virtual" lottery 9 delayed payments in exchange of higher prizes whatever the size of the prize) are also more likely inclined to participate.
The persons who have thought of a strategy for their old-age either relying on their children or their savings are more inclined to participate. By contrast the persons living in households that have access to borrowing participate less likely.
Regarding individual characteristics, higher education levels are associated with higher willingness to participate.
Included in the survey
The coefficients associated to the pension system variables confirm as expected that participation increases with the replacement rate and decreases with the contribution rate (in relation to household's income).
Finally, and not the least, participation is strongly positively related to the respondents knowledge about retirement pensions and social insurance coverage in the commune. The indicator is based on interviewed households members answer about contributing or benefiting from a social insurance program (health insurance, early retirement or meritorious pensions etc.).
PREDICTED POTENTIAL COVERAGE OF THE VOLUNTARY PENSION SYSTEM IN VIETNAM
The results of equation 2 are used to predict the willingness of the workers of the informal sector of the VSIIS to participate in the voluntary pension system that is expected to be implemented in the coming years in Vietnam.
That system is largely inspired from the regulations set for the compulsory system with some exceptions.
• Unlike in the compulsory system, participation is voluntary.
• Like in the compulsory system, participation is related to the payment of a minimum level of contribution equal to 16 percent of the minimum wage in 2008. After 2010, such percentage is expected to gradually increase by 1 p.p.
every two years until it reaches 22 percent.
• Like in the compulsory system, pension income entitlement requires a minimum length of 20 years of contribution. But, contrary to the compulsory system, participants can contribute until the age of 60 (men) or 55 (women) 10 .
As a result, only men 45 years and less and women 40 years and less when they join the voluntary system can expect receive pension income at retirement.
• Like for private sector workers in the compulsory system, a retiree's pension is a proportion of his/her average reported incomes (on which contributions were made). This proportion depends on the retiree's gender and length of contribution. In the calculation, reported incomes are indexed by past CPI.
• Unlike in the compulsory system, there is no minimum pension in the voluntary fund • Like in the compulsory system, participants who reach standard retirement age with less than 20 years of participation are entitled to a lump sum. A retiree's lump sum is a proportion of his/her average reported incomes (on which contributions were made). The proportion depends on the retiree's length of contribution. In the calculation, wages are indexed by past CPI. The levels of pension benefits are modified and replaced by the values expected in the voluntary system. These benefits vary with the length of contribution, the gender and the income on which contributions are paid (reported income). Workers can contribute higher levels than the minimum level of contributions. This study, however, assumes that all the participants participate to the new system with the lowest level of contribution. All the pension benefits are, therefore, calculated on an average reported income of 300 000 VND. The calculation takes into account the gender and the age of the person 13 , but it does not take into account possible wage growth and prices adjustments.
Pension benefits are also calculated for the persons who are eligible to lump sum allowances. In the calculation the allowances are transformed into a 15 years flow of monthly incomes (annuities), given a financial return of 7.4 percent per year.
Graph 3 and Graph 4 compares by age group the levels of the contribution and the replacement rates in the VSIIS and the voluntary pension system. The contribution rates in the VSIIS increase exponentially with age, because the system is actuarially fair. By contrast the contribution rates in the voluntary pension system are rather flat. The reason is that all the participants contribute the same amount in VND and the range of households' income per capita in the informal sector is rather narrow. The cohort age 50 to 54 has the highest level of income per capita. It is 1.6 times higher than the average income earned by the persons in the age group 15 to 19 years and, 1.2 higher than the average income earned by the persons in the age group 20 to 24 years.
Opposite trends are observed on replacement rates. In the VSIIS, replacement rates are rather flat because the level of the pension benefit is the same for all the The results of the simulation are presented in Table 3 . A worker is assumed to be willing to participate in the system if the sum of the probabilities associated to the rank 5, 6, 7 that give the probability of a respondent to accept to participate in the pension system at the proposed contribution rate is higher than zero. About 47.9 percent of the VSIIS respondents could be inclined to participate to the voluntary pension system described above. As the results reported in Table 3 show, the levels of potential participation drops after the age of 45. The low replacement rates obtained by the workers who join the system at advanced ages explain this result. 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The simulations of the package of the voluntary pension system suggest that if lower contributions effectively stimulate the participation, low pension benefits discourage participation too. These results have several policy implications.
First, it is rather inconvenient that the system discourages the participation of the older workers, since these workers (age 41 and above for the women and age 45 and above for the men) are the one who are more likely searching solutions to smooth consumption during old-age.
Second, the poor appear to be willing to participate in the pension system. It is likely that when proposed to effectively pay contributions, the poor will choose, however, other savings options that are more liquid and help them face a larger range of possible income shocks.
The consequences of the very low participation of the middle age worker and the poor populations will be that the voluntary system will have little visibility for many years. The system will potentially provide pensions to large cohorts of elderly only 20 years after its creation. Meanwhile, the efficiency of the voluntary pension system in reducing elderly vulnerability will not be demonstrated. At the opposite, the system will likely appear to fail to provide income support to the elderly that will reach retirement age. The perception that the system fails in achieving its objective could discourage, furthermore, the willingness to participate of the overall population. The results of the estimations show that participation is strongly positively related to the respondents' knowledge about retirement pensions and high social insurance coverage in the commune. If such a vicious circle develops the voluntary pension system in Vietnam will likely reach only very low coverage rates of the workers of the informal sector.
Finally, regarding the financial burden of the contribution the link of the minimum contribution to the minimum wage could adversely lead to the increase of the cost of participation to the voluntary pension system if the minimum wage increases at a faster pace than the average income per capita in the rural areas and the small household units. In accordance to the national treatment principle of the WTO 14 , Vietnam is confronted, now, with the need to rapidly unify the domestic and the minimum wages applied to the FDI enterprises. Because of the FDI high labor productivity growth, this convergence will likely need repeated large increase of the domestic minimum wage, hence large increase of the minimum level of contribution of the pension system. If incomes in the rural areas and households enterprises do not follow the same trend, the financial burden to participate to the voluntary pension system will become increasingly higher and for many workers of the informal sector unaffordable.
The obligation of a minimum contribution as well as the requirement of 20 years of contribution to be entitled to pension income are, however, rules that intend to protect the financial balance of the pension system. They reduce free-riding behaviors. Without a minimum level or length of contribution, some participants would contribute very low amounts or over very short periods. Reasonably, the accumulation of low amount of contributions at retirement should simply entitle to very low pensions. However, because providing very low pensions to elderly could appear socially unacceptable, there are risks that the pension system or the State budget could be forced to top up the "too low 14 Vietnam join the WTO in 2005 pensions" to a certain socially acceptable minimum. These transfers would benefit the poor but also to the non poor who would obtain a "free-ride". They would also undermine the financial sustainability of the system.
So instead of eliminating these obligations the next two sections investigate the possibility to propose to the middle aged workers to "buy" years of contribution and the possibility to subsidize the participation of the poor and the near poor.
IMPROVE THE ATTRACTIVNESS OF THE SYSTEM: THE MIDLED AGE PARTICIPANTS
Instead of reducing the minimum length of the contributory period, this study investigates the possibility to propose to the middle aged workers to "buy" the number of contributory years that are missing so they are entitled to pension income. In the simulation, buying years corresponds to contribute proportionally higher amounts of contribution. The impact of such policy package on replacement and contribution rates are described in Graphs 5 and 6. The replacement rates continue to decrease with age but the drastic drop observed in Graph 4 has disappeared. The consequence is that middle age workers (above age 40 in the case of the women and above age 46 in the case of the men) are required proportionally higher contributions than 15 percent of the minimum wage (Graph 6).
. Voluntary pension system older cohorts "buy years"
As the results in Table 4 indicate, such policy would have a large impact on the willingness to participate: the overall coverage is between 12.7 and 13.9 p.p. higher than under the basic package. Note: 1/the law foresees the gradual increase of the contribution rate from 15 to 22 percent of the minimum wage.
SUBSIDIZING THE PARTICIPATION OF THE POOR AND THE NEAR POOR
Instead of eliminating the obligation to pay a minimum contribution, the policy package presented in Table 5 proposes to fully subsidize the participation of the poor and partially subsidize the participation of the near poor. The participation of the near poor to the system if subsidized is obtained by adding the probability of each individual to fall into the categories (4, 3 and 2). The results in Table 5 indicate that if the contribution of the near poor is subsidized, the participation of this group could be increased by between 5.8 and 12.3 p.p. 
RISK OF OPTING OUT WHEN ESCAPING POVERTY
Some risks are associated to the policy that subsidies the participation of the poor and the near poor. Because participation is voluntary, poor who escape poverty, and near poor who become better off can abandon the system when their living conditions improve and their participation is partially or not subsidized anymore. These possible behaviors reduce the potential efficiency of the policy. Table 6 presents a prediction of the change in the participation rate of the poor in the case they escape poverty, and move up to the second quintile. It presents also estimates of the change in the participation rate of the near poor if they become better off and move up to the third quintile. In the second quintile the poor turn into near poor and benefit only from partial subsidies on contributions. In the third quintile the near poor turn into better off and do not benefit from any subsidies on contributions. The calculation assumes that the household income per capita of the poor is suddenly increased to the minimum level observed in the second quintile 210 000 VND per month. The income of the near poor when moved to the third quintile is increased to 265 000 VND per month. The estimates suggest a large desertion: more than half of the participants automatically enrolled when poor would drop out when participation is only partially subsidized. The departure is smaller but still rather large among the near poor who turned into better off (31.9 percent).
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These results are worrying, but they could be partly offset if the policy is successful in reaching large coverage rates. Giving the possibility to the older workers to buy additional contributory years and subsidizing the participation of the poor and the near poor will largely increase the potential coverage of the voluntary pension system. Higher coverage will help improve participants' knowledge and trust in the system that in turn will contribute to increase the willingness to participate. If such a virtuous circle develops, the pension system in Vietnam could achieve large coverage rates of the workers of the informal sector.
CONCLUSION
Although policy makers around the world widely recognize that social protection programs such as disability insurance, survivor insurance and old-age pensions are welfare enhancing, social insurance coverage rates in developing countries especially when the systems are not mandatory are rather disappointingly low.
This study, that investigates the determinants of the willingness to participate in a pension system by the workers of the informal sector in Vietnam, confirms the relatively low desire of these workers to participate in such scheme even if the proposed scheme is based on actuarial principles. Although willingness to participate is positively associated to higher wealth, education and saving capacities, other factors related to the residence, access to credit, fiscal burden, knowledge about social security and attitudes toward longterm planning are important. Like many public schemes, the voluntary scheme envisaged to be implemented in Vietnam could motivate higher participation by requiring lower contributions than a system strictly built on actuarial principles. However, institutional features will probably prevent the system to reach significant coverage. The link of pension income entitlement to the minimum requirement of 20 years of contributions will significantly reduce the willingness to participate of the older generation. The determination of the minimum contribution in relation to the minimum wage could possibly reduce the access to the low income earners. In that context a vicious circle could undermine the development of the voluntary system in Vietnam. Because middle age workers will likely not participate, for a long period after its creation the system will not provide meaningful pension benefit. Better off people reaching retirement will receive rather low benefits. At the same time, the population will observe that the system does little to reduce poverty among the elderly. These trends will more likely reduce the young generations' willingness to participate and they will reduce the general public support to the system. In the long-term the system might achieve very low coverage rate, as a result.
Accordingly, some argue that the provision, like in South Africa and Brazil, of noncontributory pension to the elderly that reach the age of retirement age (or a higher age) without enough income would be more effective to protect elderly against poverty. Until the government capacity to enforce tax collection increases, the structure of the economy changes, and the earning capacity of the bottom half of the labor force grows it is difficult and not desirable to extend contributory social coverage to the entire population (Estelle James, 1999) .
This study investigates another approach. It suggests that policies that allow middle age workers to contribute and obtain a pension income at retirement as well as policies that subsidize the participation of the poor and the near poor could significantly improve the system's attractiveness and coverage in the years that follow its implementation. The rapid demonstration that the system is efficient at providing pension income at retirement and at reducing poverty among the elderly could then develop a virtuous circle.
